Conceptualizing Climate Justice in Kivalina
Marissa Knodel*
Due to climate change, indigenous communities in Alaska are
forced to develop in ways that adversely affect their livelihoods and culture. Decreases in sea ice, increases in the frequency of sea storms, and
melting permafrost have accelerated erosion of the barrier island on
which the village of Kivalina sits to the point where relocation is necessary. It is unjust that communities like Kivalina have contributed little to
causing climate change but are limited in their ability to adapt.
This Article examines three broad questions and comes to four preliminary conclusions about relocation as a climate adaptation strategy
and its relation to climate justice. First, how are climate-induced impacts
understood among indigenous communities in Alaska? Second, how
does relocation affect a community’s ability to adjust to climatic changes? Third, how can community participation be increased in discussions
about, and policies for, relocation? Specifically, do discussions about
climate justice help or hinder the relocation process? My preliminary
conclusions are that first, climate-induced impacts are symptomatic of
ongoing social-historical processes that produce vulnerability and limit
adaptive capacity. Second, by taking these processes into account, climate-induced relocation can benefit from utilizing local, indigenous
knowledge and increasing community participation in relocation planning. Third, if relocation is viewed as contributing to community resilience, new opportunities to empower communities and collaborate with
state and federal agencies are possible. Finally, reframing relocation as a
climate justice issue broadens the discussion to include both its environ-
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mental and social-historical drivers, and draws connections between issues of climate change, sovereignty, and cultural survival.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Lucy Adams, a Kivalina elder, appeared resigned to a future beyond her control. The corners of her mouth turned down as she sighed,
gazed up at the ceiling as if she was looking through it into an uncertain
future, and said, “We are standing alone to try and survive.” 2 After a
moment of solemn silence, I asked her to tell me a story about resilience.
Her mood changed as she smiled and began:
Thirty years ago, we built sod igloos. Men would get wood with
dog teams. The dogs would pull the boat out onto the ice. Women
would run alongside the dogs. I would run for hours and hours and
never get tired. Everything was so clean. Clean water, clean fish.
We burned trash. There were no plastic bags. We washed clothes by
hand. If we ran out of wax candles, we used seal blubber. Everybody worked and exercised every day.3

Lucy’s narrative may sound like a depiction of an idealized past, but it
stands in stark contrast to the Kivalina of today. According to the 2010
U.S. Census, Kivalina has a total population of 374 living in eighty-five
housing units on an eight-mile barrier island in the Chukchi Sea, eighty
miles above the Arctic Circle in northwest Alaska.4 Decreases in sea ice,
increases in the frequency of sea storms, and melting permafrost have
accelerated erosion of the island to the point where relocation is necessary. The rise in public attention to climate-induced relocation and the
desire to document the phenomenon has led to an inundation of indigenous communities in Alaska with journalists, photographers, scientists,
lawyers, and politicians eager to engage with “America’s first climate
change refugees.”5 Media and official reports present the need for reloca1. In Kivalina, community members shared with me their memories, thoughts, and visions of
their future through stories. Stories are often constructed to draw out some sort of lesson or moral to
inform future research and/or political action. Conscious of this research bias, my research team
frequently discussed how to define our research question when conducting interviews in Kivalina.
When we spoke with community members, we attempted to listen more than ask, and began our
conversations by asking about contemporary life in Kivalina, how it differs from the past, and what
the future portends. We found this approach elicited greater dialogue about not just loss and uncertainty, but resiliency and hope in the relocation and recreation of home.
2. Interview with Lucy Adams, in Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 26, 2012).
3. Id.
4. 2010 Demographic Profile: AK-Kivalina ANVSA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/popfinder/?fl=6755 (last modified Aug. 6, 2013).
5. Carol Kuruvilla, Climate Change Will Cause Alaskan Village to Vanish under Water Within
10 Years: Scientists, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
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tion as a direct result of climate change, yet climate change is both an
“ecological phenomenon” as well as “an abstract idea with multiple
meanings and possible interpretations, according to the context of its
enunciation.”6 The meanings, interpretations, and enunciation—the discourse—of climate change, and the particular vulnerability of indigenous
communities in Alaska to its impacts, influence both adaptive and confrontational responses, in particular, relocation and litigation. In the case
of Kivalina, even though lack of developable space instigated the relocation process, climate change has brought renewed attention to the issue
by making visible the village’s particular vulnerability and limited adaptive capacity.
The increased visibility of Kivalina and the policies driving its
“motionless relocation” raise questions about responsibility and justice.7
The federally recognized Native Village of Kivalina and the staterecognized city of Kivalina (collectively “Kivalina”) boldly entered the
climate justice discourse in 2008 when it filed a lawsuit against nearly
two dozen energy and utility companies for damages to aid in the relocation process, based on the argument that the defendants bear the greatest
responsibility for climate change. 8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case in October 2012, and the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to hear the case.9 These legal hurdles, however, did not
end the dialogue about how Kivalina’s relocation should proceed and the
implications for community resiliency.
The terms adaptation, adaptive capacity, vulnerability, and resiliency are utilized and understood in this Article to be interrelated and applicable to a variety of disciplines, scales, and contexts. The United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) defines adaptation as the
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits
beneficial opportunities.”10 In the context of climate change, adaptation
can be considered “local or community-based adjustments to deal with
changing conditions within the constraints of the broader economicnational/alaskan-village-vanish-water-decade-scientists-article-1.1412920#commentpostform.
6. Patrick Durrer, “Global Warming Issues are Here”: Ethnography of a Motionless Relocation
in
Kivalina,
Alaska,
EUROPEAN SCI. FOUND., 18 (May
13,
2011),
http://doc.rero.ch/record/21621/files/memoire_Durrer.pdf.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
9. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2390 (May 20, 2013).
10. Terminology, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (Aug. 30, 2007),
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.
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social-political arrangements.” 11 Hence, adaptive capacity involves the
“strengths, attributes[,] and resources available within a community, society or organization” to adjust to climatic stimuli, their effects, or both.12
UNISDR defines vulnerability as the “characteristics and circumstances
of a community, system or asset that make[s] it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard.”13 In contrast, resilience is the “ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its
essential basic structures and functions.”14
The impacts of climate change exacerbate Kivalina’s vulnerability
and, consequently, reduce its adaptive capacity. To answer how Kivalina
might improve its adaptive capacity to the point of resilience, the specific
characteristics and circumstances of Kivalina’s vulnerability must be
identified. Community-based vulnerability assessments require the “active involvement of stakeholders, considerable effort to ensure legitimacy, information collection on community relevant phenomena and processes, the integration of information from multiple sources, and the engagement of decision-makers.” 15 An effective adaptation strategy will
acknowledge and attempt to reduce community vulnerability throughout
its development and execution.
This Article examines three broad questions and comes to four preliminary conclusions about relocation as a climate adaptation strategy
and its relation to climate justice. First, how are climate-induced impacts
understood among indigenous communities in Alaska? Second, how
does relocation affect a community’s ability to adjust to climatic changes? Third, how can community participation be increased in discussions
about, and policies for, relocation? Specifically, do discussions about
climate justice help or hinder the relocation process? My preliminary
analysis based on fieldwork and literature review suggests several conclusions. First, climate-induced impacts are symptomatic of ongoing social-historical processes that produce vulnerability and limit adaptive
capacity. Second, by taking these processes into account, climateinduced relocation can benefit from utilizing local, indigenous
11. Barry Smit & Johanna Wandel, Adaptation, Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability, 16
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 282, 289 (2006).
12. Terminology, supra note 10.
13. Id. A “hazard” is a “dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that
may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.” See id.
14. Id.
15. Smit & Wandel, supra note 11, at 288.
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knowledge and increasing community participation in relocation planning. Third, if relocation is viewed as contributing to community resilience, new opportunities to empower communities and collaborate with
state and federal agencies are possible. Finally, reframing relocation as a
climate justice issue broadens the discussion to include both its environmental and social–historical drivers, and draws connections between issues of climate change, sovereignty, and cultural survival.
Climate change exacerbates existing social vulnerabilities. In Part II
of this Article, these vulnerabilities are outlined broadly and detailed
specifically in the case of Alaskan indigenous communities. Part III discusses how the framing and construction of climate change in discourse
impacts how relocation is articulated and viewed at the community level.
Part IV focuses on the day-to-day discourse—the micropolitics—of climate change in Kivalina as the community negotiates its relocation. The
evolution and articulation of the climate justice discourse and the implications of the 2008 lawsuit are explored in Part V.
II. SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AMONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN
ALASKA
Climate change, and its associated policies, can reveal and exacerbate social vulnerability, which is defined as a community’s sensitivity to
environmental changes and its ability to respond and recover from their
impacts.16 Social vulnerability has roots in social structures and settlement and development patterns that affect a community’s access to resources, power, information, and networks.17 Conversely, social vulnerabilities of people and societies shape the damages associated with storms,
droughts, and slow-onset climatic changes.18 The interplay between climate change and vulnerability “involves the totality of relationships in a
given social situation producing a set of conditions that render a society
unable to absorb the impacts of a natural or social agent without significant disruption of its capacity to fulfill the basic needs of its members.”19
In other words, climate change may be “much more explainable in terms
16. Susan L. Cutter & Christina Finch, Temporal and Spatial Changes in Social Vulnerability
to Natural Hazards, 105 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 2301, 2301 (2008).
17. See KATHY LYNN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT PNW-GTR-838, at 8 (2011).
18. Jesse Ribot, Vulnerability Does Not Fall from the Sky: Toward Multiscale, Pro-Poor Climate Policy, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 47, 47 (Robin Mearns & Andrew Norton
eds., 2010).
19 . Anthony Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement: Disasters and
Diasporas in the Twenty-First Century, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM
ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS 116, 120 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall eds., 2009).
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of . . . the conditions of inequality and subordination in the society rather
than the accidental geophysical features of a place.” 20 Community responses to climate change, therefore, are the result of complex relationships between climate change and social vulnerabilities. 21 In Kivalina,
community members expressed concerns about the ability to adapt in
ways that sustain their livelihoods in a just, equitable manner. For
Kivalina, and other indigenous communities who face climate-induced
relocation, there is a need to address social vulnerability by increasing
access to information and participation in policymaking; maintenance of
local and traditional knowledge; and adaptive capacity.22
The causes, consequences, and interconnection of climate change
and social vulnerability among indigenous communities in Alaska are
contextualized by environmental changes and extractive resource development; limited authority and resources to adapt to climate-induced impacts; socioeconomic and sociocultural stress; indigenous identity and
knowledge; and subsistence livelihoods.
A. Environmental Changes and Extractive Resource Development
The 2005 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) concluded
that “[i]f the scientific projections and scenarios are realized, climate
change could have potentially devastating impacts on the Arctic and on
the peoples who live there, particularly those indigenous peoples whose
livelihoods and cultures are inextricably linked to the arctic environment
and its wildlife.”23 Alaska has seen an increase in winter temperatures of
three to four degrees Celsius over the past fifty years with a projected
rise of another three to give degrees by the end of the century.24 This

20. Id.
21. LYNN ET AL., supra note 17, at 8. Social vulnerability within indigenous populations is
shaped by (1) equity and justice; (2) culture and knowledge; and (3) adaptive capacity. Id. at 7. Equity and justice include “access to and participation in the processes and outcomes of policymaking, as
well as ethical and legal issues related to responsibility among governments and populations to address climate change.” Id. Culture and knowledge include “the impact of climate change on current
and future generations, local and traditional knowledge, sense of place, and treaty rights and access
to traditional resources.” Id. Adaptive capacity refers to the “relative power among populations,
ability to address climate effects, and access to social processes and resources.” Id.
22. Kyle Powys Whyte, Justice Forward: Tribes, Climate Adaptation and Responsibility, 120
CLIMATIC CHANGE 517, 523–24 (2013).
23. ARCTIC COUNCIL & INT’L ARCTIC SCI. COMM., ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
659 (Carolyn Symon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), available at
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html.
24 . JONATHAN M. HANNA, NATIVE COMMUNITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: PROTECTING
TRIBAL RESOURCES AS PART OF NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 11 (Jonathan M. Hanna, ed. 2007),
available at http://www.tribesandclimatechange.org/docs/tribes_116.pdf.
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warming trend significantly impacts the extent and volume of Arctic sea
ice.
The December 2012 Arctic Report Card found Arctic sea-ice levels
in September to be the lowest on record, with continual decreases in multi-year sea ice.25 Lack of summer sea ice raises development concerns, as
areas for fossil fuel exploration and extraction change, and new shipping
routes become available.26 While there is the potential for jobs and increases in tax revenue from fossil fuel and mineral development,27 there
is also the potential for increases in contamination, pollution, and environmental degradation directly from exploration and extraction activities,
as well as indirectly from the greenhouse gas emissions of fossil fuel
combustion.28
Warmer temperatures on land and sea also result in less shore ice,
which leaves coastal villages more vulnerable to storm surges and floods.
A 2003 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that 184
out of 213 (86% percent) Alaska native villages are becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion due in part to rising temperatures.29 The
report also found that four villages—Kivalina, Newtok, Koyukuk, and
Shishmaref—“are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion” and
will need to relocate. 30 The Executive Subcabinet on Climate Change,
established in 2007 by former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, formed the
Immediate Action Workgroup (IAW) to identify the immediate needs of
communities imminently threatened by erosion, flooding, permafrost
degradation, and other climate change-related impacts.31 The IAW identified communities, including Kivalina, in need of immediate assistance
and facilitated meetings with community representatives to develop response strategies.32 Based on IAW recommendations, the Alaska legislature established the Alaska Climate Change Impact Mitigation Program33
25. See Arctic Report Card: Update for 2012, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/report12/ (last visited June 10, 2014).
26. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11–12.
27. Oil and gas revenue comprised 92% of Alaska’s unrestricted revenue in fiscal year 2011.
State Revenue, ALASKA OIL & GAS ASS’N, http://www.aoga.org/facts-and-figures/state-revenue/
(last visited June 10, 2014).
28. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11–14.
29. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-142, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST ARE
AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 2–3 (2003)
[hereinafter GAO 2003 REPORT].
30. Id. at 4.
31. IMMEDIATE ACTION WORKGROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR’S SUBCABINET
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2009), available at http://www.climatechange.alaska.gov/docs/iaw_finalrpt
_12mar09.pdf.
32. Id. at 3–4.
33. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 195.040 (2009).
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(ACCIMP) to “address the immediate planning needs of communities
imminently threatened by the impacts of climate-related natural hazards
such as erosion, flooding, storm surge, and thawing permafrost.”34 The
ACCIMP permits the Commerce, Community, and Economic Development Department to award, on a non-competitive basis, a grant of
$10,000 to $50,000 to six eligible communities, including Kivalina, for a
Hazard Impact Assessment (HIA) to identify climate change-related impacts and recommend actions in response.35 Based on the HIA recommendations, the department may award, on a competitive basis, grants of
up to $150,000 per community for planning services.36 To date, none of
the six communities have successfully relocated.
In 2009, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) conducted the Alaska
Baseline Erosion Assessment, which compared the cost of erosion control versus the cost of relocation, and found sizeable funding gaps.37 The
assessment estimated infrastructure costs due to erosion over a twentyyear period in Kivalina at $105 million; however, given the amount of
current and projected erosion, the community may become uninhabitable
over the next ten to fifteen years.38 The relocation of Kivalina is estimated to cost $123.4 million, but this amount may be too low because it
would provide for only a minimal level of housing, water, and sanitation
facilities.39 In addition, both federal and Alaskan post-disaster response
statutes limit funding to restoration of infrastructure to its condition prior
to the disaster, not to relocation efforts.40 Funding to address relocation is
often unavailable to communities because they lack approved disaster
mitigation plans, have not been declared a federal disaster area by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or are unincorporated
villages in an unorganized borough and do not qualify for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development Block Program.41 Furthermore, federal funds are designed to
34 . See Alaska Climate Change Impact Mitigation Program, ALASKA DEP’T OF COM.,
COMMUNITY, & ECON. DEV., http://commerce.alaska.gov/dnn/dcra/PlanningLandManagement/
ACCIMP.aspx (last visited June 10, 2014).
35. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3 § 195.040(a) (2009).
36. Id. § 195.040(b).
37. See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS ALASKA DIST., ALASKA BASELINE EROSION
ASSESSMENT: AVETA REPORT SUMMARY—KIVALINA, ALASKA (2009), available at
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/Kivalina_Final%20Report.pdf.
38. See id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. See ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.010 (2008).
41. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED
PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION
20–24 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009 REPORT].
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supplement state and local resources for reconstruction in the current
location, not to fully fund relocation.42
To help address these statutory and financial gaps, the GAO recommended the following: a feasibility study of response alternatives to
flooding and erosion; a policy to guide future infrastructure investments;
a flood assessment conducted by ACE to augment their recent erosion
assessment; grants for housing and community development; and the
creation of a lead federal entity that could work with a lead state agency
to help communities coordinate and oversee relocation efforts. 43 The
2009 GAO follow-up report found that “no single comprehensive proactive federal program to assist villages with their relocation efforts” exists.44
These environmental changes in the Arctic increase the social vulnerability of indigenous communities in Alaska in a number of significant ways: limited authority and resources to adequately adapt to climate
change; socioeconomic and sociocultural stress; the maintenance of traditional knowledge; and the ability to practice a subsistence way of life.45
B. Limited Authority and Resources
For indigenous communities in Alaska, climate-induced relocation
cannot be separated from the history of government-mandated relocation
and land dispossession, which have hindered the application of traditional knowledge to climate change adaptation. 46 When Alaska became a
state in 1959, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) divided village
land into lots, determined a base price for each, and auctioned them off.47
Because many indigenous people were either hunting or had little money
or experience with auctions, many missed the auction and were dispossessed, becoming “homeless in [their] homeland.”48 Most Alaskan territory was under federal jurisdiction, and Congress granted the new state
government the right to select up to 104 million acres of federal land for

42. Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 365
(2011).
43. See generally GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 41; GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 29.
44. GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 41, at 20.
45. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11–14.
46. See Julie Koppel Maldonado et al., The Impact of Climate Change on Tribal Communities
in the US: Displacement, Relocation, and Human Rights, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 601, 603 (2013).
47. See WILLIAM L. IĠĠIAĠRUK HENSLEY, FIFTY MILES FROM TOMORROW: A MEMOIR OF
ALASKA AND THE REAL PEOPLE 109–10 (Sarah Crichton Books 2009).
48. Id. at 108.
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state ownership.49 Consequently, land with the greatest potential for oil,
gas, and mineral development fell under state control.50 In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) that
awarded forty-four million acres, approximately 16% of Alaska’s territory, and $962.5 million to Alaskan Natives for relinquishing claims to the
rest.51
Soon, however, it became clear that ANCSA was not the just transition to land sovereignty that Congress envisioned. ANCSA extinguished
all claims of aboriginal title, including hunting and fishing rights, and
replaced them with multiple regional corporations and the ability to establish village corporations, wholly owned by qualified Alaska natives
(i.e., those born prior to December 18, 1971).52 William Hensley, Alaska’s first Native state representative in Congress who also helped write
ANCSA, admits in his memoir that in the attempt to “accommodate
modernization,” ANCSA was responsible for crowding out “the consciousness of our people’s heritage, purpose, and survival as a culture.”53
The replacement of rights in land and resources with individual shares in
corporations “can be seen as being driven by the policy of assimilation”
that limits the ability of indigenous peoples to maintain their subsistence
and cultural patterns as well as self-determination.54 Hensley states that
“[r]ules were being made for us by people whose mandate was to change
us by attacking the very essence of what made us unique: our languages,
our names, our religion, our customs, and our values.”55
During the forty years since ANCSA passed, James Anaya, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples,
was “struck by indications about how the economic and cultural transformations accelerated by ANCSA have bred or exacerbated social ills
among indigenous communities, manifesting themselves, for example, in
high rates of suicide, alcoholism, and violence.”56

49. Id. at 111.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 159.
52. See Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, The Situation of Indigenous
Peoples in the U.S., Hum. Rts. Council, ¶¶ 58–60, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47/Add.1 (Aug. 30, 2012)
(by James Anaya) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur]; Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1607–1608 (2012).
53. HENSLEY, supra note 47, at 214.
54. Special Rapporteur, supra note 52, ¶ 59.
55. HENSLEY, supra note 47, at 129.
56. Special Rapporteur, supra note 52, ¶ 62.
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C. Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Stress
Kivalina displays many of the “social ills” referred to by Special
Rapporteur Anaya. Tribal Administrator Stanley Hawley mentioned that
due to limited building space, there has been no new construction of
homes in Kivalina, which leads to overcrowding.57 “People are paying
the price” for the lack of developable land space, he said, referring to a
three-room house occupied by seventeen people.58 The combination of
overcrowding, unemployment, and inhibited ability to practice a subsistence lifestyle creates tension within the community, which continues to
experience cases of drug and alcohol abuse, sexual and domestic violence, suicides, and crime. For example, in October 2012, two teenagers
were charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, and tampering with
evidence when they broke into the Kivalina Native Store and stole
$189,000.59 Incidents like these are compounded by a lack of adequate
policing, health care, and other public services.60 These socioeconomic
and sociocultural stressors characterize social vulnerability within the
context of climate variability.61
D. Indigenous Identity and Knowledge
Indigenous knowledge, a rich source of observations of environmental changes that goes back for millennia, plays an important role in
climate change adaptation strategies and assessments. 62 Indigenous
knowledge is defined generally as a “cumulative body of knowledge and
beliefs, handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about
the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and
with their environment.” 63 Indigenous knowledge is of particular im57. Interview with Stanley Hawley, Tribal Adm’r, Native Vill. of Kivalina IRA Council, in
Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 25, 2012).
58. Id.
59. Teens Charged in Theft of $189K at Kivalina Store, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://juneauempire.com/state/2012-10-03/teens-charged-theft-189k-kivalinastore#.UMNcQJPjmQY.
60. E-mail from Stanley Hawley, Tribal Adm’r, Native Vill. of Kivalina IRA Council, to
Marissa Knodel (Mar. 17, 2014) (on file with author).
61. Timothy J. Finan, Climate Science and the Policy of Drought Mitigation in Ceará, Northeast Brazil, in WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND CULTURE 203, 205 (Sarah Strauss & Benjamin S. Orlove
eds., 2003).
62. See KRISTEN VINYETA & KATHY LYNN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPLORING THE ROLE OF
TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES, GENERAL TECHNICAL
REPORT PNW-GTR-879, at 9 (2013); Henry Huntington & Shari Fox, The Changing Arctic: Indigenous Perspectives, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 62, 62–95 (2005), available at
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Science_Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch03_Final.pdf.
63. Matthew Lauer & Shankar Aswani, Indigenous Ecological Knowledge As Situated Practices: Understanding Fishers’ Knowledge in the Western Solomon Islands, 111 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
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portance to climate adaptation in the Arctic, where accelerated global
warming makes weather conditions increasingly difficult to forecast and
presents dangers to subsistence hunters.64
Among the Iñupiaq,65 the northernmost group of aboriginal people
that inhabit northwest Alaska and parts of northern Canada and Greenland, the classroom is the environment of snow, ice, and ocean, and the
teachers are the elements as well as community elders. Iñupiaq
knowledge as it relates to the environment is informed by over 1,000
years of experience and preserved in the form of oral tradition. 66 The
Iñupiaq language consists of a group of dialects and adaptive behaviors
passed down from one generation to the next through stories that help
transform practice and experience into memory. 67 Generational inheritance of elders’ knowledge and experience depends upon “communitybased oral histor[ies]” and “land-based experiential learning” in order to
pass on the knowledge and experience of elders through successive generations. 68 Joe Swan, a Kivalina elder, said that elders know people
“learn through experience,”69 but that the younger generation is “spoiled”
because they don’t want to hunt, get a job, or provide for their family, yet
“survival is dependent on cultural heritage.” 70 Swan further stated,
“There is no future survival unless there’s something you think and create. These are not just old stories. The younger generation needs help to
carry on Iñupiaq traditions because culture is going to change.” 71 The
cultural attitudes and values such as patience, persistence, calmness, respect for elders, and respect for the environment embedded within traditional knowledge allow indigenous communities to remain resourceful
and resilient in a changing world.72
317, 322 (2009) (quoting Fikret Birkes, Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Perspective, in
TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE CONCEPTS AND CASES 3 (Julian T. Inglis, ed. 1993)).
64 . See DOUGLAS NAKASHIMA ET AL., WEATHERING UNCERTAINTY: TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION 35 (David McDonald ed.,
Stéphanie Ledauphin et al. trans., 2012), available at http://www.ipmpcc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Weathering-Uncertainty_FINAL_12-6-2012.pdf.
65. Iñupiaq and Inuit tend to be used interchangeably, although Inuit usually refers to the people living in Canada and Greenland.
66 . Anne Henshaw, Climate and Culture in the North: The Interface of Archaeology,
Paleoenvironmental Science, and Oral History, in WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND CULTURE, supra note
61, at 217, 226.
67. Id. at 220.
68. Id. at 226.
69. Interview with Joe Swan, in Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 26, 2012).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See James Ford et al., Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Arctic: The Case of
Nunavut, Canada, 60 ARCTIC 150, 158 (2007).
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The recognition and incorporation of indigenous knowledge and
ways of comprehending the environment, weather, and climate were issues of contention between Alaska Natives and the U.S. government prior to the prominence of climate change in the policy arena. When Alaska
became a U.S. territory in 1867, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) subsequently removed children from their homes to classrooms designed to
sever any connection to their indigenous identity and culture.73 The use
of native language was forbidden and continuously suppressed as native
children were told “who they were was not good enough” and that “they
should leave behind the world of their parents and grandparents and become something different.”74
Despite this assimilationist policy, the use of indigenous knowledge
continues to demonstrate a “holistic understanding” of the environment
that looks at how different components of an ecosystem relate.75 By embedding this knowledge within the context of climate change, the resilience of vulnerable indigenous communities may be strengthened.
E. Subsistence Culture
The Iñupiaq practice a subsistence lifestyle of hunting whale, caribou, seal, walrus, polar bear, musk-ox, fish, and birds, which gives them
an intimate understanding of the Arctic landscape and ocean. Climate
change has the potential to adversely impact subsistence culture through
limitations on the availability and abundance of species and the increased
risk and difficulty of activities associated with subsistence living. 76
Kivalina City Mayor Austin Swan said, “Climate change impacts our
lifestyle. We have to go farther to get what we need, but we’re losing the
sea ice.”77 In Kivalina, I was told the community has been unable to successfully hunt whale since the mid-1990s,78 and caribou are becoming
scarcer.79 Further, a drought in June and July of 2012 was followed by
heavy rain in August, which decimated the berry harvest.80
For many indigenous communities in Alaska, subsistence culture is
about more than sustenance; it is about the process of sharing and reaffirming “fundamental values and attitudes towards animals and the environment and provides[s] a moral foundation for continuity between gen73. See HENSLEY, supra note 47, at 72.
74. Id. at 78.
75. See Henshaw, supra note 66, at 218–19.
76. See HANNA, supra note 24, at 11.
77. Interview with Austin Swan, Mayor, City of Kivalina, in Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 26, 2012).
78. Interview with Lucy Adams, supra note 2.
79. Interview with Stanley Hawley, supra note 57.
80. Interview with Lucy Adams, supra note 2.
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erations.”81 In the words of Joe Swan: “No food, no future. Period.”82
Even though many indigenous communities in Alaska practice only a
partially subsistence lifestyle, commentators suggest that such a close
connection to ecosystem goods and services allow these communities to
“interpret and react to climate change impacts in creative ways, drawing
on traditional knowledge as well as new technologies to find solutions,
which may help society at large to cope with the impending changes.”83
Climate change undermines the foundation for indigenous
worldviews, which are “embedded in a holistic framework that connects
the land to the air and water, the earth to the sky, the plants to the animals, the people to the spirit.”84 For indigenous peoples, “climate change
is not something that comes in isolation; it magnifies already existing
problems of poverty, deterritoriality, marginalization, and noninclusion
in national and international policy-making processes and discourses.”85
In sum, climate change both causes and exacerbates the inability of indigenous communities in Alaska to practice a subsistence way of life and
maintain their traditional knowledge in a place of health and safety,
which undermines their land and cultural sovereignty in an already contested landscape. Given that climate-induced vulnerabilities have led
several indigenous communities in Alaska to plan for community relocation, it is important to understand how relocation as a climate adaptation
strategy is viewed within the climate change discourse.
III. RELOCATION WITHIN THE CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE
Environmental disasters and the people they impact are constructed
and framed by social, economic, and political factors, which provide a
theoretical basis for the assertion that “we construct our own disasters
insofar as disasters occur in the environments that we produce.”86 Similarly, the impacts of climate change are “socially, politically, and economically mediated, distributed, and interpreted, with measures to miti81. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11 (citing ARCTIC COUNCIL & INT’L ARCTIC SCI. COMM., supra
note 23).
82. Interview with Joe Swan, supra note 69.
83. VINYETA & LYNN, supra note 62, at 9 (citing Jan Salick & Nanci Ross, Traditional Peoples and Climate Change, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 138 (2009)).
84. Patricia Cochran et al., Indigenous Frameworks for Observing and Responding to Climate
Change in Alaska, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 557, 559 (2013); Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall, Introduction: Anthropology and Climate Change, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM
ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS 12 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall eds., 2009).
85. Crate & Nuttall, supra note 84, at 11.
86. Anthony Oliver-Smith, Theorizing Disasters: Nature, Power, and Culture, in CATASTROPHE AND CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF DISASTER 23, 43 (Susanna M. Hoffman & Anthony Oliver-Smith eds., 2002).
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gate and respond similarly structured.”87 Climate change is both a “narrative” and “material phenomenon” such that its meanings and consequences are shaped by particular cultural values and practices of particular groups of people in particular places.88 Climate change may also be
characterized as a “moving target” because the “media portrayal of climate change, the excessive dramatizing of apocalyptic events, or the
downplaying of scientific evidence and the critique of scientific motive . . . have significance for how climate change is defined, understood,
and legitimated.”89
The climate change discourse emerging from international development agencies, research institutions, NGOs, consultancies, and investigative journalism position climate-vulnerable populations as both victims and evidence of the climate crisis, which changes the way local
events are framed and understood.90 People who are forced or who voluntarily move in response to climate change “appear as subjects who
seem to speak directly for the climate” and become a visible entity by
which the public can engage with the climate change discourse.91 Discourses that describe climate change “refugees” are “actively and continually negotiated as part of their production” and, “like any representations, are neither static nor innocent. . . . [T]hey are vehicles for power,
characterised [sic] by fluid, ongoing claims of inclusion and exclusion,
dependent on the interests of those engaged in them.”92 Hence, in discussions about climate-induced relocation, characterizing the community as
victims versus empowered agents changes the nature of the discourse
from disasters to resiliency.
The nature of the climate change and refugee discourses impact
how relocation is articulated and viewed at the community level. One
perspective views displacement and resettlement as “second disasters”
following environmental and climatic changes.93 Oliver-Smith writes that
the “uprooting of livelihood and community” implies a loss of individual
and social identity tied to a particular environment; thus, relocation requires a reinvention of self and community that has both “material and
87. Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement, supra note 19, at 120.
88. See Carol Farbotko & Heather Lazrus, The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global
Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 382, 382 (2012).
89. Crate & Nuttall, supra note 84, at 11.
90. See Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 88, at 382; Kay Milton, Anthropological Perspectives
on Climate Change: Introduction, 19 AUSTL. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 57, 57–58 (2008); Durrer, supra
note 6, at 18.
91. Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 88, at 385.
92. Id. at 383.
93. Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement, supra note 19, at 122.
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social aspects,” the resources for which are often diminished during the
relocation process:94
[L]osses of community, family, and self compound each other to
create a cumulative loss of meaning. . . . They challenge the culturally constructed vision where the world is a place imbued with logic
and life makes sense, even if it can be unfair. Major disasters rob
people of the social context in which they live meaningful lives that
are considered significant by others. This loss of personal relationships and the social context in which they were expressed and in
which the individual was affirmed may leave people bereft of a
sense of meaning and purpose in life.95

An alternative perspective is to view relocation as an adaptation
strategy that builds resiliency. If the impacts of relocation on communities result in the negative consequences listed above, then moving in anticipation of climate change may precipitate and minimize its social and
political costs by allowing adequate time for community consultation and
planning.96 Researchers Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus discuss how
in Tuvalu, an island in the South Pacific, migration in response to climate
change threats can be considered a source of economic and social
strength because of its long-term approach to climate change adaptation. 97 They conclude by advocating for the incorporation of “cultural
values, national identity, ongoing practices of migration and change,
sovereignty, and compensation”98 into the climate change adaptation discourse and that relocation as an adaptation strategy must address “equity,
identity[,] and human rights.”99 As discussed in the next Part, the relocation discussion that began in the late 1960s has evolved from a debate
over developable space between Kivalina and the state of Alaska to include climate adaptation and other institutions. For relocation to be seen
as a strategy to build resilience, significant changes must be made to engage the community to collectively address all of Kivalina’s social and
environmental vulnerabilities.

94. Id. at 122–123.
95. Id. at 123.
96. See Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Migration As Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 37, 53 (Jane McAdam
ed., 2010).
97. Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 88, at 388.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 383, 388.
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IV. CLIMATE CHANGE MICROPOLITICS IN KIVALINA
Climate change micropolitics examines the term “climate change”
through the day-to-day discourse of communities, which has the potential
to foster new opportunities for collaboration, resistance, or both. Professor Tania Murray Li defines “micro political economy” as “day-to-day
discourse and practice through which people seek to gain or defend access to land, labour [sic] and other productive resources.” 100
Micropolitics emphasizes human agency and focuses on the “creative
ways in which cultural ideas are adapted to meet new conditions, and
culturally informed practices, in turn, structure daily life and shape and
reshape institutions at various levels.”101 This process of transformation
involves the “contestation and revision of meanings of key terms” 102
through “[a]ction and inaction, speech and silence, compliance and resistance.”103
For example, a group of five professors studied the words used to
describe climate change and its environmental impacts between two African-American communities in the Chesapeake Bay Region to see how
they influenced expressions of adaptation options. 104 They found that
instead of a scientific understanding of the linkages between greenhouse
gas emissions and global warming, most people had “robust and varied
understandings of climate change”105 based primarily on local experiences and media sources.106 When it came to adaptation responses, the two
communities expressed consciousness of the influence of power and
money in terms of support to prepare for climate change, but they differed when it came to how to prepare, due primarily to differences in
their physical location and level of risk exposure to flooding. 107 The
study concluded that it is essential to better understand how climate
change becomes situated in communities that face different risks and
social vulnerabilities and that adaptation will ultimately be “site specific”
and “a human endeavor of social relationships with exchanges of infor-

100. Tania Murray Li, Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations,
27 DEV. & CHANGE 501, 509 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 510–511.
104. See generally Michael Paolisso et al., Climate Change, Justice and Adaptation Among
African American Communities in the Chesapeake Bay Region, 4 WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 34
(2012).
105. Id. at 42.
106. See id. at 42–44.
107. Id. at 45.
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mation and resources.”108 In sum, climate change simultaneously fosters
diverse meanings and offers the potential for collaboration by a variety
of social groups at the local level.109
The micropolitics of climate change demonstrate that communities
are not passive players with predictable reactions to a changing environment. Rather, community responses will be determined by “endogenous
factors that vary considerably from location to location, reflecting variations in culture, economy, social history, and land-use practices.”110 The
micropolitics of climate change in Kivalina reveal a community well
aware of the need to relocate, but unable to do so due to geographical,
financial, and political factors beyond their control or influence.
A. Geographical Factors
The barrier island where Kivalina is now located used to be a seasonal hunting ground. However, in 1905 the BIA built a school there and
ordered parents to enroll their children or face imprisonment.111 The island’s location between the Chukchi Sea and Kivalina lagoon make it
susceptible to natural hazards such as storms, flooding, erosion, melting
permafrost, and sea-level rise.112 This location also limits adaptation responses because there is no land area to expand, no water distribution,
sewer, or waste disposal systems, and only one and a half miles of unmaintained trails for transportation. 113 The later formation of sea ice,
which normally provides a buffer, has accelerated erosion of the island in
recent years and increased impacts from storms. 114 The governor of
Alaska and FEMA declared Kivalina a disaster area in 2002, 2004, and
2005.115 The state of Alaska again declared Kivalina a disaster emergency in September 2012 when record rainfall raised the water level of the
Kivalina and Wulik rivers and flooded the village landfill. 116 The flood108. Id. at 46.
109. ANNA LOWENHAUPT TSING, FRICTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL CONNECTION 245
(2005).
110. Frank Duerden, Translating Climate Change Impacts at the Community Level, 57 ARCTIC
204, 206 (2004).
111. CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA: A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 34 (2011).
112. See Glenn Gray & Assocs., Situation Assessment: Kivalina Consensus Building Project 2,
7, RE-LOCATE KIVALINA (July 2010), http://www.relocate-ak.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2012/09/Situation_Assessment_Final_July_20105.pdf [hereinafter Kivalina Consensus Building
Project].
113. Id. at 4–5.
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id. at 11.
116. Alaska Governor Sean Parnell, Declaration of Disaster Emergency, ST. OF ALASKA (Sept.
7, 2012), http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell_media/resources_files/09072012_disaster_declaration.pdf.
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ing damaged water transmission lines before the city could refill the water tanks, resulting in a high reported incidence of dehydration among
elders and infants.117 Due to financial and statutory limitations that are
detailed below, erosion control projects were largely unsuccessful and
only temporary solutions to ongoing climatic changes.
B. Financial Factors
In response to the violent storms in 2005, the Northwest Arctic
Borough attempted to build a seawall using Hesco Concertainers—wire
mesh baskets filled with sand and gravel—that villagers were told had
been used successfully in other parts of the state to control erosion.118
However, because there was no scoping meeting and the Concertainers
were filled with sand and gravel from Kivalina’s beaches, the opposite
occurred.119 The day before the ceremony to celebrate the wall’s completion in October 2006, a storm pulled the sand from underneath the baskets and completely dismantled the multi-million dollar project.120
In 2005, Congress passed § 117 of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, which granted federal funds for ACE to conduct storm damage protection projects for Alaska Native villages.121 As a temporary protection
measure, ACE approved construction of a rock revetment project designed to be 3,200 feet long and encase the entire island. Funding was
only secured, however, for 1,600 feet on the seaside of the island.122 All
construction stopped in 2009 when § 117 was rescinded.123 Funding authorization was replaced in October 2009, but only provided a 35%
match of non-federal funds and did not appropriate any funds for Alaska
erosion control or relocation projects.124
C. Political Factors
With ACE and others forecasting increasing storms and erosion, no
room for settlement expansion, and limited fortification options, Kivalina
residents know that relocation is inevitable. In fact, the village first voted

117. E-mail from Stanley Hawley, supra note 60.
118. Kivalina Consensus Building Project, supra note 112, at 15–16.
119. Id.; see also Molly Lane, Kivalina Endangered: An Eroding Village, EXTREME ALASKA,
http://www.uafjournalism.com/extreme/index.php/frozen-phenomena/kivalina-weathers-the-stormbut-for-how-long (last visited June 12, 2014).
120. Kivalina Consensus Building Project, supra note 112, at 16 tbl.2.
121. SHEARER, supra note 111, at 132.
122. Id. at 138.
123. Id.
124. See H.R. 3183, 111th Cong. § 116 (2010) (enacted).
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to relocate in 1992 and formed a Relocation Planning Committee.125 In
2000, a special election to select a relocation site was held, and Kivalina
residents overwhelming chose Kiniktuuraq, located seven and a half
miles southeast of the village that has long been used as a camping
ground during hunting trips. 126 When ACE released its 2006 Kivalina
Relocation Master Plan, it declared Kiniktuuraq was “geotechnically
inappropriate and strategically problematic” because the site is a floodplain with ice rich soil that would need to be replaced with twelve feet of
gravel. 127 Kivalina elders and other community members disputed this
conclusion and argued that when it flooded in Kivalina, there was no
flooding in Kiniktuuraq because it was located at a slightly higher elevation.128 Instead of offering the community a vote to select an alternative
site, the ACE recommended the Imnaaquq Bluffs or Tatchim Isau instead, both of which were unacceptable to the community because they
would be too expensive and inconvenient to continue their subsistence
lifestyle.129
Disagreement over the relocation site illustrates the challenge of integrating indigenous and scientific knowledge. Indigenous knowledge
often lacks the systematic and quantitative measurements and data collection on which scientific knowledge relies, while scientific knowledge
often fails to include locally appropriate variables and parameters. 130
Both indigenous communities and scientific researchers stand to benefit,
however, from respectful collaboration. Scientific researchers acquire a
better understanding of indigenous values and local expertise, while indigenous communities gain a better understanding of climate change and
technologies for coping with its impacts. 131 Climate change adaptation
strategies, such as relocation, should be based on the best available
knowledge that comes from constructive dialogues and co-production of
new knowledge between indigenous peoples, scientists, and policymakers.132 Knowledge co-production that includes traditional knowledge for
125. SHEARER, supra note 111, at 140.
126. Id. at 142.
127. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Alaska Dist., Relocation Planning Project Master Plan:
Kivalina, Alaska, CLIMATE ADAPTATION KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE, at ES-1 (June 30, 2006),
http://www.cakex.org/sites/default/files/Executive%20Summary.pdf.
128. SHEARER, supra note 111, at 143; E-mail from Stanley Hawley, supra note 60.
129. Rachel M. Gregg, Relocating the Village of Kivalina, Alaska Due to Coastal Erosion,
CLIMATE ADAPTATION KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.cakex.org/casestudies/2773.
130. See NAKASHIMA ET AL., supra note 64, at 36.
131. Terry Williams & Preston Hardison, Culture, Law, Risk and Governance: Contexts of
Traditional Knowledge in Climate Change Adaptation, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 531, 532 (2013).
132. See NAKASHIMA ET AL., supra note 64, at 66.
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adaptation as well as indigenous processes, techniques, and tactics of
developing, sustaining, and refreshing such knowledge is fundamental
for research and projects that strive to integrate traditional and scientific
knowledge.133
Co-learning and co-production of knowledge do not, however,
guarantee fairness or understanding, or address power asymmetries. 134
When indigenous communities are asked to share their traditional
knowledge, safeguards provided through free, prior, and informed consent procedures should be invoked to ensure the provision of all appropriate information necessary to make an informed decision.135 Because
indigenous knowledge embodies the identities, histories, legacies, and
responsibilities for generations that comprise what remains of indigenous
cultures, it ought to be researched and utilized for the purpose of selfdetermination in lieu of commercialization or exploitation.136
In order to help resolve the conflict between Kivalina and federal
agencies over the relocation site, the Kivalina Consensus Building Project was launched. 137 The project lasted from September 2009 to July
2010, and involved door-to-door surveys, meetings, and workshops between community members and state and federal officials. During these
negotiations, community leaders asked whether “it was . . . the federal
government’s responsibility to relocate Kivalina” and often expressed
frustration, mistrust, and “battle fatigue” from years of discouragement.138 State and federal officials noted that the lack of progress towards
relocation and the continuing threat of natural hazards have serious implications for the mental health of the community. Many community
members expressed a sense of hopelessness.139 In reference to community attitudes to relocation, one environmental coordinator said,
It’s like they are stuck here and it feels that way. We need to somehow build their dreams again, we need to somehow give them a vision again, some kind of hope again, that thing[s] will get better,

133 . INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, MARGINALIZED POPULATIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
VULNERABILITY, ADAPTATION AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE WORKSHOP REPORT 33 (2011),
available at http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/2011_IPMPCC_Mexico_Workshop_Summary
_Report-Final.pdf.
134. Williams & Hardison, supra note 131, at 532.
135. Id. at 536.
136 . See LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 220–21 (Zed Books Ltd. 2d ed. 2012).
137. See Durrer, supra note 6.
138. Id. at 49–50.
139. Kivalina Consensus Building Project, supra note 112, at 5, 30.
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that here will be water and sewer, that there will be places to build
for the children and grandchildren.140

By the end of the project, participants reached consensus on five main
conclusions:
1. Relocation efforts have been blocked thus far and need to be
reconsidered with the local village government in the lead,
along with collaboration with state and federal agencies;
2. Hope must be created and maintained;
3. There is a need to further address communication difficulties
between stakeholders;
4. The relocation process requires participation and consensus
among all stakeholders; and
5. Relocation policies must incorporate ongoing climatic changes.141
As of 2012, Kivalina has prepared Community Evacuation and
Emergency Operations plans, and ACE and Kivalina are finally in
agreement on a potential terminal site for an evacuation route in case of
emergency, located on a hill five miles inland called Kisimigiuktuk.142
Kivalina’s village government and its contractor, WH Pacific, are working with the BIA-Anchorage and the Maniilaq Corporation—a native
non-profit organization that provides social and health services to twelve
federally recognized tribes in the Northwest Arctic Borough—to try and
secure funding for the evacuation route.143 When asked about a community relocation plan, Stanley Hawley called the idea a “dead horse.”144
Frustration with the lack of progress, resources, and attention given to
Kivalina’s relocation by state and federal agencies instigated the 2008
lawsuit that entered the community into the climate justice discourse,
discussed in the following Part.
V. CLIMATE JUSTICE DISCOURSE IN KIVALINA
Climate change is a global phenomenon that has and will continue
to affect every person on the planet, though with disparate impacts. These disparities are disproportionately felt by the people who are the most
140. Durrer, supra note 6, at 51.
141. See id. at 56.
142. E-mail from Stanley Hawley, supra note 60.
143. Letter from Stanley Hawley, Tribal Adm’r, Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council, to
Marissa Knodel (Oct. 25, 2012) (on file with author).
144. Id.
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poor, vulnerable, and unable to react, adapt, and plan for climatic changes. Because climate change impacts are ultimately experienced at the
local level, they are difficult for policymakers to address because issues
of justice, equity, and inequality create different vulnerabilities.145 The
interconnection between climate change and social vulnerabilities leads
to questions about blame for the causes of climate change, responsibility
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and help for communities to prepare for and adapt to the inevitable effects.146 When climate change adaptation strategies turn to relocation, contentious questions about where to
relocate—how, who should be involved, and who should pay—are
raised. The fact that communities like Kivalina have contributed little to
causing climate change but are limited in their ability to adapt to its consequences speaks to injustice. Inadequate governance mechanisms and
budgets to address climate-induced relocation and support adaptation
strategies “may cause loss of community and culture, health impacts, and
economic decline, further exacerbating tribal impoverishment and injustice.”147 In this light, relocation as a climate adaptation strategy “represents several formal and retrospective layers of injustice” against indigenous communities because they “cannot escape having to deal with problems they largely did not bring about[,] and there are no obvious institutional options that avoid substantial tradeoffs.”148
A. Evolution of the Climate Justice Discourse
Climate injustice is “the idea that harm from the deleterious effects
of climate change, and the production and materialist processes associated with it, is unevenly distributed and deliberately falls disproportionately on the marginalized and the disadvantaged.”149 Climate justice, therefore, holds that because the richest most developed nations have contributed the most to causing climate change, they have a greater obligation to
take immediate action.150 Central to this assignment of responsibility are
the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibility,
which are included in the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
145. Paolisso et al., supra note 104, at 34.
146. LYNN ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.
147. Maldonado et al., supra note 46, at 601.
148. Whyte, supra note 22, at 523.
149. Michael K. Dorsey, Climate Knowledge and Power: Tales of Skeptic Tanks, Weather
Gods, and Sagas for Climate (In)justice, 18 CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 7, 14 (2007), available
at http://envs.ucsc.edu/internships/available-internships/new-internships/dorsey-climate-reading.pdf.
150 . BARBARA ADAMS & GRETCHEN LUCHSINGER, U.N. NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON
SERV., CLIMATE JUSTICE FOR A CHANGING PLANET: A PRIMER FOR POLICY MAKERS AND NGOS, at
ix, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/NGLS/2009/2, U.N. Sales No. E.09.I.19 (2009).
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Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was created in 1992 for the purpose
of “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system” and concluded that developed countries should “take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” and
provide new and additional resources, both financial and technical, to
developing countries to help implement the Convention. 151 During the
twenty years since the UNFCCC was agreed to by the community of nations, minimal progress toward its stated goal has been achieved; in fact,
a significant gap exists between country pledges to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions and the chance of holding global average temperature below 2°C above preindustrial levels—the threshold beyond which very
serious and irreversible consequences that threaten life, sovereignty, and
societal sustainability will occur.152 The lack of progress in the face of an
increasing number of adverse climatic changes has sparked climate justice debates that go beyond the distributional aspects of climate change
impacts, responsibilities, and costs, to the instruments created to deal
with these aspects and the processes by which they are developed and
implemented.
B. Articulations of Climate Justice
The theory of articulation seeks to understand “how ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse” and “how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects.”153 In other words, the theory of
articulation asks how an ideology “discovers” its subject and “empowers” it to make sense of its situation.154 For example, Professor Li argues
that a group’s self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not something
natural or inevitable, but neither is it invented, adopted, or imposed.155
Rather, it is a “positioning” that emerges from patterns of global–local

151. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 4 (May 9, 1992), http://unfccc.int
/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
152 . See U.N. Env’t Programme, Bridging the Emissions Gap Report, U.N. Doc. No.
DEW/1470/NA (2011).
153. STUART HALL, CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 141–42 (David Morley &
Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 1996), available at http://filsafattimur.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/criticaldialogues-in-cultural-studies.pdf.
154. Id. at 142.
155. Tania Murray Li, Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the
Tribal Slot, 42 COMP. STUDS. IN SOC’Y & HISTORY 1, 151 (2000), available at
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2696637?uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=211036847
55187.
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engagements that create new boundaries as well as connection. 156 An
articulation, therefore, is a linkage that is “not necessary, determined,
absolute and essential for all time,” but given different form and meaning
depending on how it is articulated in a particular context.157
The variety of linkages that exist between climate change and other
environmental, social, political, and economic issues contribute to the
articulation of climate justice. At the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, a coalition of organizations called the International
Climate Justice Network158 produced the “Principles of Climate Justice,”
which seek to redefine climate change from a human rights and environmental justice perspective. These principles were largely based on the
“Environmental Justice Principles” prepared by the People of Color Environmental Justice Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. in 1991,
which require “democratic decision making, community empowerment,
and the incorporation of social culture” in environmental decisionmaking processes, with the most important concept being “community
self-determination.” 159 The Environmental Justice and Climate Change
Initiative (EJCC), a coalition of climate and environmental justice, policy, religious, and advocacy organizations in the United States, defines
climate justice as “the fair treatment of all people and freedom from discrimination with the creation of policies and projects that address climate
change and the systems that create climate change and perpetuate discrimination.”160 In sum, the climate justice movement binds together liberation and economic and ideological sovereignty not by one uniform
belief or message, but by the common belief that present systems and
processes of decision making are insufficient to resolve the crisis of climate change, and other paths are both necessary and possible.161 Key to
fair treatment is equitable representation and participation of vulnerable
communities in the development and implementation of strategies to improve their resiliency. Climate justice strategies should therefore consider “how the people most vulnerable to climate change are involved in the
156. Id. at 151, 174.
157. HALL, supra note 153, at 141.
158. The International Climate Justice Network includes the following: CorpWatch; Friends of
the Earth International; Greenpeace International; Groundwork; Indigenous Environmental Network;
Indigenous Information Network; National Alliance of People’s Movements; National Fishworkers
Forum; OilWatch Africa; OilWatch International; Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice; Third World Network; and World Rainforest Movement. International Climate Justice Network, CORPWATCH (Aug. 28, 2002), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3748.
159. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 16 (2000).
160. LYNN ET AL., supra note 17, at 14.
161. See Dorsey, supra note 149, at 20.
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development of policies, the language used to address them, and, ultimately, how they are affected by the outputs and outcomes of climate
policies and plans.”162
C. The Articulation of Climate Justice in Kivalina
The frustrating lack of support and action in the midst of an eroding
island prompted Kivalina to examine other alternatives for gaining voice
and funds for relocation. In 2008, Kivalina filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California against two dozen oil, coal,
and power companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp., BP America, Duke
Energy Corp., and Shell Oil Co., for public and private nuisance, as well
as conspiracy and concert of action. 163 The complaint asserted these
companies emitted greenhouse gases they knew contributed to the global
warming that has melted the sea ice surrounding the village, leaving the
residents there vulnerable to storms and erosion that will force the village
to relocate.164 Kivalina sought money damages to assist with relocation
and other adaptation measures.165 The court granted the companies’ motion to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction over the common law nuisance claim, which is based on U.S. federal law (the remaining claims
relied on state law). The court declared that Kivalina lacked standing
because “there is no realistic possibility of tracing any particular alleged
effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, group at any particular point in time.”166 The court also determined that resolution of the nuisance claim would require the Judicial
Branch to make a policy determination concerning appropriate limits on
greenhouse gas emissions and who should bear the cost of global warming, which are political questions better left to the Legislative or Executive Branches of government.167 The court dismissed the state law-based
claims without prejudice, which means that Kivalina may re-file the case
in Alaska state court.168 Kivalina appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision.169 The Ninth Circuit, however, chose a different theory on which to
162. LYNN ET AL., supra note 17, at 14.
163. See generally Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
164. Id. at 868.
165. Id. at 869.
166. Id. at 880.
167. Id. at 876–77.
168. Id. at 882–83.
169. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2390 (May 20, 2013).
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dismiss the case. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 170 the Court declared that
Kivalina’s public nuisance claim was not justiciable because the Clean
Air Act, which directly addresses domestic greenhouse gas emissions
from stationary sources, had displaced it.171 According to the Ninth Circuit, the fact that Kivalina was seeking damages and not emissions reductions made no difference to the doctrine of displacement. 172 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that while it is aware its decision does not aid
Kivalina, “which itself is being displaced by the rising sea,” the solution
to the village’s situation rests with the Legislative and Executive Branches of government.173 While both the lawyers and supportive villagers expressed doubts that the lawsuit would ultimately be successful, they saw
value in the attention that would be gained to their situation and cause.174
Researcher Elizabeth Marino points out that Kivalina’s lawsuit may be
an attempt to “gain, not just state and federal money towards relocation,
but to regain control over movement of people over traditional lands; an
effort . . . to reinvent the power relationship between Native villages and
government.”175
The articulation of climate justice in Kivalina reflects the struggle
to maintain their subsistence culture in a place of their choosing. Enoch
Adams, a Kivalina community member, noted the power dynamics involved in the relocation process as part of a history of injustice and inequality:
The federal government has a trust responsibility to the tribes, and
they need to enact that. The state of Alaska needs to pony up monies that they have been taking by getting resources from our land,
and share it with the communities that need it the most. When you
take a real close look at this, this is a human rights issue. There is
racism involved. There is class warfare.176

Do legal actions like the Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.
lawsuits promote a “shared fairness” that take the principles of responsi170. Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
171. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856.
172. Id. at 858.
173. Id.
174. Letter from Colleen Swan, Kivalina City Council, Relocation Project Coordinator, to
Marissa Knodel (Oct. 25, 2012) (on file with author).
175. Elizabeth Marino, Immanent Threats, Impossible Moves, and Unlikely Prestige: Understanding the Struggle for Local Control as a Means Towards Sustainability, 8–9 (U.N. Univ. Inst.
For Env’t and Human Sec., Summer Academy Working Paper, 2008), available at
https://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/3822.
176. SHEARER, supra note 111, at 147.
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bility based on equity, empowerment through participation, and a reconfiguration of power dynamics into account?177 Voices at the community
level are mixed. Some expressed support for the lawsuit because it raised
their voice in the call for attention to the responsibility fossil fuel companies and energy utilities bear for contributing to climate change.178 Others viewed the lawsuit as a waste of resources that attracted negative attention to the village and limited the willingness of outside entities to
fund the relocation effort.179 Regardless of the legal outcome, the lawsuit
served as an intervention that created a new, though confrontational,
space for dialogue about relocation as a climate justice issue from the
perspective of a small Native village in Alaska. What remains to be seen
is whether this intervention also created new opportunities for collaborative action and community participation to advance the relocation effort
in a just and equitable manner. Thus, climate justice for Kivalina is both
an ideological discourse about responsibility and a political struggle for
equal participation, sovereignty, and cultural survival.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impacts of climate change place stress on the people, practices,
and institutions responsible for the adaptive capacity and resilience of a
community.180 The indigenous peoples of the Arctic have been living and
adapting to environmental changes for centuries and are not ignorant of
the increasing pace of change.181 As climate change drives the relocation
of several indigenous communities in Alaska, strong emphasis has been
placed on finding ways to adapt that create resilient communities in new
locations. However, state action and community involvement in cases of
relocation cannot be divorced from environmental and social vulnerabilities. Even though indigenous communities in Alaska are able to observe
climate change, understand its ecological and societal consequences,182
and develop potential response strategies,183 the limited choices and re-

177. See J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF INJUSTICE: GLOBAL
INEQUALITY, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS, AND CLIMATE POLICY 136 (2006).
178. Letter from Colleen Swan, supra note 174.
179. Letter from Stanley Hawley, supra note 143.
180. Whyte, supra note 22, at 518.
181. See generally ARCTIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM OF THE U.S. & ARCTIC STUDIES CTR.,
THE EARTH IS FASTER NOW: INDIGENOUS OBSERVATIONS OF ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
(Igor Krupnik et al. eds., 2002).
182. See generally id.
183. See generally Garrit Voggesser et al., Cultural Impacts to Tribes from Climate Change
Influences on Forests, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 615 (2013); see also Cochran et al., supra note 84, at
558.
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sources community members have available increases the likelihood that
relocation will produce negative consequences. 184 In other words, the
struggles of the past shape discussions of the future.185
When the inevitable prospect of community relocation enters the
climate change discourse, the dominant image that arises is the climate
change “refugee”—a victim of the climate crisis forced to adapt in ways
that may lead to loss of home, identity, and certain cultural practices.
This perspective is not without merit, because climate change exacerbates many existing vulnerabilities that persist due to Kivalina’s location
on a barrier island, subsistence lifestyle, and related socioeconomic and
sociocultural stressors. Communities like Kivalina that have limited access to information, resources, power, and networks can benefit from the
visibility such public attention produces.186 However, playing the role of
the climate victim risks the loss of community voice and agency within
this dominant discourse. The articulation of climate change and relocation as a climate justice issue may present a contradiction in intent and
outcome as Kivalina’s vulnerability and victimization are emphasized
within a discourse driven largely by discussions at international climate
change negotiations and among outside interest groups. Whether the lawsuit pushes new boundaries for collaboration and resistance with state
and federal agencies for relocation assistance remains to be seen.
An alternative perspective is to view relocation as an opportunity to
build resilience and address contentious issues such as responsibility for
the drivers of climate change, allocation of resources to help with relocation, and justice in terms of equal participation, sovereignty, and maintenance of cultural identity during the relocation process. The complexity
of the causes, consequences, and processes to address climate-induced
relocation requires a more comprehensive and open-ended approach to
migration planning and decision making so that mobility may be seen as
part of the solution rather than the problem.187 By recognizing and addressing the contextual elements that interconnect climate change and
social vulnerability, Kivalina can improve its adaptive capacity and foster resilience. For example, relocation may provide both increased secu-

184. Elizabeth Mikow, Negotiating Change: An Overview of Relocations in Alaska with a
Detailed Consideration of Kaktovik 104 (May 25, 2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of Alaska
Fairbanks),
available
at
http://www.alaska.edu/move/result/alaska/negotiating-change-anove/Elizabeth-Mikow-MA-Thesis.pdf.
185. Id. at 105.
186. LYNN ET AL., supra note 17, at 8.
187. Oliver-Smith, supra note 86, at 131; Cecilia Tacoli, Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and
Climate Change in a Context of High Mobility, 21 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 513, 514 (2009).
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rity from natural hazards and opportunities to improve housing, energy,
water, sewer, and waste systems.188
The key question for Kivalina in the near future is how to incorporate participation into the relocation process with a discourse sensitive to
indigenous conceptions of terms that carry meaning within their specific
historical, political, and cultural contexts.189 A participatory approach to
relocation would take the community perspective into account by placing
local, traditional knowledge on an equal footing with foreign—
particularly scientific—expertise, as well as include free, prior, and informed consent procedures. 190 An adaptive governance framework to
implement the relocation policy would include planning and funding for
relocation; creating institutional leadership to facilitate dialogue between
scientists, community leaders, policymakers, and government representatives; authenticating the local government’s role as a leader and decision
maker in the relocation process; and establishing an operational plan that
provides for staffing, capacity building, agency coordination, health
monitoring, and information dissemination within an urgent and realistic
timeline.191 Colleen Swan told me that “we need recognition that our traditional ways are still alive.”192 Future research into the evolving climate
change and justice discourses and actions taken to relocate the community should ensure local participation by taking their situated knowledge
and experiences into account and making the process of relocation their
own. There is still community resilience of the kind Lucy Adams spoke;
one has only to see Kivalina through the eyes of the people who call it
home.

188. Kivalina Consensus Building Project, supra note 112, at 33.
189. David Mosse, The Ideology and Politics of Community Participation: Tank Irrigation
Development in Colonial and Contemporary Tamil Nadu, in DISCOURSES OF DEVELOPMENT:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 279 (R.D. Grillo & R.L. Stirrat eds., 1997).
190. James Fairhead & Melissa Leach, Reading Forest History Backwards: The Interaction of
Policy and Local Land Use in Guinea’s Forest-Savanna Mosaic, 1893–1993, 1 ENVT. & HISTORY
55, 85 (1995), available at http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/
Fairhead-Leach-1-1.pdf.
191. Bronen, supra note 42, at 400–03
192. Letter from Colleen Swan, supra note 174.

